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InitialsDiceBearhttps://github.com/dicebear/dicebearhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Initials” (https://github.com/dicebear/dicebear) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)MI
Posts
22
Comments
1,341
Joined
2 yr. ago

  • It safeguards nothing. The signature is litterally meaningless. You can scribble whatever you want. And anyone one could have scribbled it. It's still the cops word against the person's. There is no notary present to verify anything. And now there is probably bodycam footage.

  • The school was about what you said feeding kids. And yes, a lot of libraries have reservable meeting space now. More should for exactly the reason you are saying. I am agreeing with you about needing to fill the void, and saying we should expand schools and libraries to better and more consistently do that. Currently they probably only do that in blue states.

  • Jerkoff

    Jump
  • So in response to cops stereotyping minorities, let's sterotype all cops? Then let's take that to the extreme and disrepect a dead person you know nothing about, for laughs.
    Even If you knew for a fact that the person in that cofin was a bad cop, does thier family deserve this image being passed around like this. No. One could understand if your motive was to help effect change, and crossing this line would help. But you are doing it for laughs and internet points. There is nothing good about that.

  • Yeah, something like that. But while your device can validate the cryptographic sig for the app, the site requesting proof of age can't, since it isn't running on the same device as the app. The best I can guess, the app could request verification from the state run site, and specify what information it wants (based on what the requestor site asked for). The state site could use a private key to encrypt the response and give it back. The app could use a piblic key the state makes available to decode and confirm that only the intended information is present. Then the app can pass that to the requestor, who can get the public key from the state site and decrypt the information. But, the gap there is how does the requestor know the app it is talking to hasn't been modified. I don’t think there is a way that it can. Only the device the app is on can verify that. And the requestor can't trust the device either.
    Some Authentication that I remember has a component where the requestor would then talk to the state to confirm the info it got from the app was requested from the state by the same app the site is talking to. This prevents using someone elses response as your own. But in this case, that would tie the site to the request which means the state would have both peices of info, who and what site. So I don’t know what there solution here could be that wouldn't result in the same problem.

  • My bad, I had the german government mixed up with probably the brits who are constantly saying they need to be able to read everyone's messages. That said. It's hard to know what the intelligence arm of a government is really doing. So if they give themselves a backdoor, it's hard to ensure only they come in. And the government is always only one election away from dramatic policy changes.