litchralee @ litchralee @sh.itjust.works

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2 yr. ago

That book sounds very insightful. I hope my public library accepts my purchase suggestion.

You are correct: even when you have a live body on the stand about to give testimony, it is essential to lay the foundation as to who they are and their legitimacy. Obviously, if they aren't who they say they are, that's a huge problem. So the party who called the witness will have done their homework in advance, and the opposing lawyers will have been notified in advance of this witness's appearance and conduct their own homework.

For when a person is testifying but they aren't in the room, I understand that there are several requirements that a telepresence system must comply with, both technical and usability. Certainly, someone's visage or image would be preferable to an audio-only phone call. Presumably, the jury needs to trust this witness to believe them or else it's rather pointless. Nowadays, with deep fakes and AI, it could possibly become an issue in future if video appearances in court are actually faked, or if the suggestion becomes plausible due to advancements in the technology.

So if we think of the zombie not as a live body but someone whose presence is being facilitated by the necromancer's abilities, then the necromancer must be quizzed as to the veracity of their abilities, and the court would have to question what limits must be imposed on the testimony to make it admissible.

If it's anything like the bunk science that courts have previously adopted -- bite mark analysis comes to mind -- then it only takes one court to permit necromancy and other courts will point to that one case as precedence. This would only be a problem if the necromancy is flawed in some serious way.

I'm not a lawyer, but let's have some fun with this.

To start, I'm going to have to assume a jurisdiction. I'll go with California, because Hollywood films have depicted a lot of walking dead, zombies, and whatnot. And also because that's the jurisdiction I'm most familiar with. I think that such a case where the undead might be a witness would mostly arise in California state courts, since zombies rarely walk/jump/crawl quickly enough to cross state lines from the major population centers of California, which would invoke federal jurisdiction.

Now, we need to hone in on the type of case. A murder case where the victim is called as a witness would certainly be very juicy. But the same legal intrigue would arise from a less-interesting inheritance or family law case. We could also go into contracts and see whether or not the presence of an undead counts as an "act of God" but maybe that's a bit too niche and law-school theoretical.

To really showcase the problems this would pose to the court, we will focus on the undead being witness in a criminal trial, as the standard of proof to convict the defendant would be proof "beyond a reasonable doubt". As the most stringent category of proof, it necessarily follows that the court must err on the side of the defendant in matters of impartiality. This is because the court is technically an arm of the state, and the prosecution wields all the resources of the state against an individual who stands accused of some criminal act.

As such, for criminal trials, there are certain constitutional rights of the defendant that the court must uphold. The foremost is the right to due process, guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. One of the results from applying due process is that evidence introduced in a criminal trial must not be "unduly prejudicial". That is, no evidence can be admitted which so irresponsibly causes the jury to render a verdict based on anything but the law.

Often, this rule is invoked to set aside irrelevant evidence which has no bearing on the charges, except maybe to impugn the reputation of the defendant so that the jury thinks they're a terrible person. Other times, it can be used to exclude relevant but really-bad evidence. The US courts have been through cycles where novel science is used in a prosecution but which later turns out to be bunk and lacking any foundation in reality. It certainly is "evidence" but because it purports to be science when it's really not, it must be excluded. Psychics are certainly not going to be welcomed witnesses as a subject matter expert.

Finally, the other category for evidence being unduly prejudicial is when the jury -- through no fault of their own -- would weigh that evidence as being the primary factor, above all else, whether it's DNA or video evidence. This is more a matter of testimony evidence rather than physical evidence. Imagine a small, devoutly religious town where the local pastor is called to testify about whether the defendant could have committed hit-and-run.

Having a respected community authority figure testify about someone's potential to commit a crime might be something the jury members would be open to hearing, but the judge might have to weigh whether the fact that the lay witness is a pastor will cause the jury to put too much weight on that testimony, even though the pastor is no more able to weigh someone's character than some other member of the community. If there are other ways to obtain the same evidence -- such as bringing in the defendant's mother or employer -- the judge should not allow the pastor to testify, because it could jeopardize the soundness of the trial and lead to an appeal.

So now we come back to zombies. Would a jury be able to set aside their shock, horror, and awe about a zombie in court that they could focus on being the finder of fact? If a zombie says they're an eye-witness to a mugging, would their lack of actual eyeballs confuse the jury? Even more confusing would be a zombie that is testifying as an expert witness. Does their subject matter need to be recent? What if the case needs an expert on 17th Century Parisian fashion and the undead is from that era and worked in haute couture? Are there no fashion historians who could provide similar expert opinions?

But supposing we did overcome all that, there might be one form of testimony which -- even though very prejudicial -- might be allowable for a lay-witness (ie not expert) zombie witness to testify about, and I already mentioned it earlier.

In most jurisdictions and in California, a dying person's last act which might point to their killer will not necessarily be excluded for being irrelevant or being circumstantial. It is a rebuttable presumption that someone dying has no incentive to lie, and will likely have been the final witness to their own murder.

To that end, it's entirely plausible that a zombie who died by murder could come to court to testify against their killer. Of course, how long does it take for the dead to become undead? If this takes longer than the statue of limitations allows (note: California has no limits for charging murder), the defendant would walk. Likewise, if the zombie's testimony is the only shred of evidence for the murder, that's not likely to convince the jury. Not unless, of course, the details of the testimony match the circumstances of the crime so well that it wasn't a fluke.

TL;DR: rules of evidence would still apply to the undead, and judges must take care to balance the probative value of evidence with any prejudicial quality it may carry.

(to be abundantly clear, this was a schittpost lol)

I will admit that my familiarity with private law outside the USA is almost non-existent, except for what I skimmed from the Wikipedia article for the Inquisitorial system. So I had assumed that private law in European jurisdictions would follow the same judge-intensive approach. Rereading the article more closely, I do see that it really only talks about criminal proceedings.

But I did some more web searching, and found this -- honestly, extremely convenient -- article comparing civil litigation procedure in Germany and California (the jurisdiction I'm most familiar with; IANAL). The three most substantial differences I could identify were the judge's involvement in: serving papers, discovery, and depositions.

Serving legal notice is the least consequential difference between California and Germany, but it seems that the former allows any qualified adult to chase down the respondent (ie person being sued) and deliver the notice of a lawsuit -- hence the trope of yelling "you have been served" and then throwing a stack of papers at someone's porch -- on behalf of the complainant (person who filed the lawsuit). Whereas German courts take up the role themselves for notifying the complainant. Small difference, but notable.

In Germany, the court, and not the plaintiff, is required to serve the complaint on the defendant without undue delay, which is usually immediately after it has been filed with the court.

Next, discovery and pleadings in Germany appear to be different from the California custom. It seems that German courts require parties to thoroughly plead their positions first, and only afterwards will discovery begin, with the court deciding what topics can be investigated. Whereas California allows parties to make broad assertions that can later be proven or disproven during discovery. This is akin to throwing spaghetti at the wall and seeing what sticks, and a big reason this is done is because any argument that isn't raised during trial cannot be reargued during a later appeal.

I believe that discovery in California and other US States can get rather invasive, as each party's lawyers are on a fact-finding mission where the truth will out. The general limitation on the pleadings in California is that they still must be germane to the complaint and at least be colorable. This obviously leads to a lot of pre-trial motions, as the targeted party will naturally want to resist a fishing expedition during discovery.

Lastly, depositions in Germany involve the judge(s) a lot more than they would in California. Here, depositions are off-site from the court and conducted by the deposing party, usually video-taped and with all attorneys present, plus a privately hired stenographer, with the deposing attorney asking questions. Basically, after a deposition order is granted by the judge, the judge isn't involved unless during the deposition, the process is interrupted in a way that would violate the judge's order. But the solution to that is to simply phone the judge and ask for clarification or a new order to force the deposition to continue.

Whereas that article describes the German deposition process as always occuring in court, during trial, and with questions asked by the judge(s). The parties may suggest certain questions by way of constructing arguments which require the judge(s) to probe in a particular direction. But it's not clear that the lawyers get to dictate the exact questions asked.

In contrast, depositions in Germany are conducted by the judge or the panel of judges and only during trial.

I grant you that this is just an examination of the German court proceedings for private law. And perhaps Germany may be an outlier, with other European counterparts adopting civil law but with a more adversarial flavor for private law. But I would say that for Germany, these differences indicate that their private law is more inquisitorial overall, in stark contrast to the California or USA adversarial procedure for private litigation.

Lasers work really well in space for secure sat-to-sat data links, but are a lot less viable on Earth's surface due to diffraction and weather, nevermind the limits of the visible horizon for any height of a communications tower. For pretty much any scenario where laser comms would be considered, microwave RF links would likely be just as good, cheaper, and more commonly deployed and understood by telecom engineers. The only exception is when absurdly high bandwidths are needed, which is where lasers rule.

But using RF links across thousands of kilometers of oceanic waters? For that, you must construct additional pylons on floating islands to repeat the signal. Otherwise, the only RF signals that could reach land would be too low frequency to carry much bandwidth.

For reference, when the German Aerospace Center (DLR) set the world record in 2016 for free-space optical communications, they achieved 1.72 Tbits/sec over a distance of 10.45 km. Most optical systems observe a bandwidth/distance relationship, where at best, shooting the signal farther means less available bandwidth, or more bandwidth if brought closer. This is a related to the Shannon-Hartley theorem, since the limiting factor is optical noise.

So if 1.72 Tbits/sec at 10 km is the best they achieved in free air in 2016, then that pales in comparison to the undersea fibre cables of 2006, where a section of the SHEFA-2 Scottish-Faroese cable runs unamplified for 390 km and moves 570 Gbits/sec aggregate.

In short, free-space lasers are fast and long-distance. But lasers within fibre cables are much faster and cover even longer distances. They're not even in the same league.

You are absolutely correct: this fragile experiment called democracy will not survive if the citizenry becomes ambivalent about its institutions, allowing corrupt officials and other enablers of authoritarianism to take root.

If you are an American and that prospect disturbs you, then you need to help strengthen and guard the institutions that protect the core American values. Nobody owes you a democracy.

For some ideas of what to do, this post by Teri Kanefield has a list of concrete actions that you can take: https://terikanefield.com/things-to-do/

I am usually not wont to defend the dysfunction presently found in the USA federal (and state-level) judiciary, but I think this comparison to the German courts requires a bit more context. Generally speaking, the USA federal courts and US States adopt the adversarial system, originally following the English practice in both common law and equity. This means the judge takes on a referee role, and a plaintiff and a defendant will make their best, most convincing arguments.

I should clarify that "common law" in this context refers to the criminal matters (akin to public law), and "equity" refers to person-versus-person disputes (akin to private law), such as contracts.

For the adversarial system to work, the plaintiff and defendant need to be sufficiently motivated (and nowadays, well-monied) to put on good arguments, or else they're just wasting the court's time. Hence, there is a requirement (known as "standing") where -- grossly oversimplifying -- the plaintiff must be the person with the most to gain, and the defendant must be the person with the most to lose. They are interested parties who will argue vigorously.

Of course, that's legal fiction, because oftentimes, a defendant might be unable to able to afford excellent legal counsel. Or plaintiffs will half-ass or drag out a lawsuit, so that it's more an annoyance to the opposite party.

In an adversarial system, it is each party's responsibility to obtain subject-matter experts and their opinions to present to the court. The judge is just there to listen and evaluate the evidence -- exception: criminal trials leave the evaluation of evidence to the jury.

Why is the USA like this? For the USA federal courts, it's because it's part of our constitution, in the Case or Controversy Clause. One of the key driving forces for drafters of the USA Constitution was to restrict the powers of government officials and bureaucrats, after seeing the abuses committed during the Colonial Era. The Clause above is meant to constrain the unelected judiciary -- which otherwise has awe-inducing powers such as jailing people, undoing legislation, and assigning wardship or custody of children -- from doing anything unless some controversy actually needed addressing.

With all that history in mind, if the judiciary kept their own in-house subject-matter experts, then that could be viewed as more unelected officials trying to tip the scale in matters of science, medicine, computer science, or any other field. Suddenly, landing a position as the judiciary's go-to expert could have broad reaching impacts, despite no one in the federal judiciary being elected.

In a sense, because of the fear of officials potentially running amok, the USA essentially "privatizes" subject matter experts, to be paid by the plaintiff or defendant, rather than employed by the judiciary. The adversarial system is thus an intentional value judgement, rather than "whoopsie" type of thing that we walked into.

Small note: the federal executive (the US President and all the agencies) do keep subject matter experts, for the limited purpose of implementing regulations (aka secondary legislation). But at least they all report indirectly to the US President, who is term-limited and only stays 4 years at a time.

This system isn't perfect, but it's also not totally insane.

Can you please kindly link to that article, if it's publicly available?

This page appears to describe the standardized process for registering to vote as an overseas absentee voter: https://www.fvap.gov/citizen-voter/

It states that whether or not you just want to vote for federal offices, the important criteria is to establish your "voting residency", and then the elections office of that county would send you a ballot for what you're eligible to vote for. Your last US address appears to be the predominant determinator, even if you have no more ties to it.

I can't imagine this will be simple to navigate, but I applaud you for seeking to exercise your important civil right to vote. Good luck!

Not the Roman Empire. :)

If you'll permit me to broaden the question to "why are political subdivisions allowed to sue each other?", then the answer often is two-fold: 1) political subdivisions are incorporated entities under the law, so they have a right to pursue redress in front of a higher court, and 2) when the higher power is unclear about the division of rights to the subdivisions, then only a court can dispense the issue.

For #1, this is the same power which allows a city, county, municipality, special district, state, and sometimes the federal government to obtain an enforcement order against an individual or company. An example would be an injunction to stop dumping more toxic waste into a river. It should be clear that if a city, county, or state was dumping toxic material into a river, the higher level of government would want to stop that too.

For #2, ambiguity is rife when it comes to poorly drafted legislation or decisions which "passed the buck" far into the future. Historical examples involving borders include the British Partition of India or the Delaware Wedge, the latter which was in dispute for nearly 300 years. You can also find examples in international law, such as whether or not certain islands count as territory for the purpose of extending a country's Exclusive Economic Zone.

In the Delaware Wedge case, because the matter involved three or four US States, the matter would ultimately have to be adjudicated by a federal court, either directly before the US Supreme Court or through arbitration under the auspices of the court. Alternatively, Congress potentially could have settled the matter forthright, but since the dispute predates the founding the union, Congress probably thought the states would quickly work it out on their own.

Here in California, we see some similar misgivings between the state's own political subdivisions, with a recent example where a county District Attorney brought suit against the most populous city within that county, alleging that state law was being violated.

As for how a county is allowed to prosecute a state law violation, and why a city can be a target or such prosecution, we need to briefly look at the structure of California governance. Despite what some critics have suggested, California is not a homogenous, unitary state with a singular political and social identity. Rather, it may be one of the most decentralized states in the union, with cities with populations in the low hundreds to the low millions, all coexisting within one set of general state laws.

The state's primary subdivisions are the counties, which divide all the land into 58 counties. Counties are responsible to citizens within their borders, authorized to write and enforce laws, except that county laws don't apply within incorporated borders. That is, cities.

In essence, the incorporation of a city creates an enclave within a county, and while the state limits what categories of laws a county may author, cities have much more "home rule" authority. This is what allows the City of Los Angeles (pop. 3.8 million) and Amador City (pop. 200) to have similar powers yet clearly applied much differently. It would be a madhouse in the state Legislature if every city needed custom legislation to enable them to serve their people appropriately. So California just lets the cities do their own thing, within reason.

In terms of enforcement, to prevent overworking the state Attorney General, enforcement of the state's laws are delegated to the county District Attorneys. These 58 attorneys wield the power of the state within their county borders, such as brokering a plea deal or bringing enforcement lawsuits.

The safeguard is that the state Attorney General can -- at any time -- take over an ongoing prosecution from the county DA. For example, investigations involving city police misconduct are now by-default taken away from the county DA and investigated by the state AG, because of a historical pattern of police being too cozy with the DA.

In the earlier case where the county sued the city within it, the state AG could have also taken that case away and then drop the matter. But seeing as the case was already slipshod, the AG probably just decided to let it run its course, where a judge would likely dismiss it.

TL;DR: political subdivisions do weird things if no guardrails exist or if no other alternative appeara

From the State Medical Board of Ohio:

On September 8, 2016, House Bill 523, legalized medical marijuana in Ohio.

From a June 2024 AP article:

Recreational pot sales are nearing reality in Ohio ... The state Division of Cannabis Control began accepting applications [on 7 June] for new dual licenses that will allow existing medical marijuana dispensaries to also sell nonmedical cannabis.

While states with medical cannabis generally issue regulations for which patients are eligible and which doctors can prescribe, the products themselves are mostly subject to meeting lab tests for containing what they say on the label, and distribution in child-resistant packaging. Otherwise, the same stock for medical cannabis customers is about the same as for recreational cannabis.

Hence, while it might be surprising that a new cannabis dispensary could appear out of nowhere -- even without a preceding medical cannabis dispensary at the same location -- the wholesaling, backend infrastructure, and vendor network may already have existed, so propping up a storefront would be the relatively easy part.

This is an interesting application of so-called AI, where the result is actually desirable and isn't some sort of frivolity or grift. The memory-safety guarantees offered by native Rust code would be a very welcome improvement over C code that guarantees very little. So a translation of legacy code into Rust would either attain memory safety, or wouldn't compile. If AI somehow (very unlikely) manages to produce valid Rust that ends up being memory-unsafe, then it's still an advancement as the compiler folks would have a new scenario to solve for.

Lots of current uses of AI have focused on what the output could enable, but here, I think it's worth appreciating that in this application, we don't need the AI to always complete every translation. After all, some C code will be so hardware-specific that it becomes unwieldy to rewrite in Rust, without also doing a larger refactor. DARPA readily admits that their goal is simply to improve the translation accuracy, rather than achieve perfection. Ideally, this means the result of their research is an AI which knows its own limits and just declines to proceed.

Assuming that the resulting Rust is: 1) native code, and 2) idiomatic, so humans can still understand and maintain it, this is a project worth pursuing. Meanwhile, I have no doubt grifters will also try to hitch their trailer on DARPA's wagon, with insane suggestions that proprietary AI can somehow replace whole teams of Rust engineers, or some such nonsense.

Edit: is my disdain for current commercial applications of AI too obvious? Is my desire for less commercialization and more research-based LLM development too subtle? :)

At its very core, an insurance company operates by: 1) pooling policyholder's risks together and 2) collecting premiums from the policyholders based on actuarial data, to pay claims and maybe make a small profit. But looking broader, an insurance market exists when: a) policyholders voluntarily or are obliged to obtain policies, b) insurers are willing and able to accept the risks in exchange for a premium expected to support the insurance pool, and c) the actuarial risks are calculable and prove true, on average.

The loss of any of A, B, or C will substantially impact a healthy insurance market, or can prevent the insurance market from ever getting started. For some examples of market failures, the ongoing California homeowner insurance crisis shows how losing B (starting with insurers refusing to renew policies near the wildland-rural interface) and C (increase in insured losses due to climate change) results in policies becoming unaffordable or impossible to obtain.

As a broader nationwide example, an established business sector that operates wholly without insurance availability is cannabis. A majority of US States have decriminalized marijuana for medical use, and a near-majority have legalized recreational consumption. Yet due to unyielding federal law, no insurer will issue policies for marijuana businesses, to protect from risks that any business would face, such as losses from fire, due to a product recall or product liability, or for liability to employees. These risks are calculable and there's a clear need for such policies -- thus meeting criteria A and C -- but no commercial insurer is willing to issue. Accordingly, the formal market for cannabis business insurance is virtually non-existent in the USA.

With these examples, we can see that the automobile insurance market meets all three criteria for a healthy market, but it's how these criteria are met which is noteworthy. Motorists in the USA are obliged to insure in every state except New Hampshire and Virginia: it is a criminal offense to drive a car without third-party liability insurance, meaning the motorist might spend time in jail. Note: NH and VA won't send a motorist to jail, but they do have administrative penalties for driving without "financial responsibility", which includes insurance or a bond at the DMV.

The exact requirement varies per state, with some requiring very low amounts of coverage and others requiring extra coverage like Personal Injury Protection (PIP, aka no-fault insurance). The point is that criteria A is easily met: motorists want to avoid jail, but also want to avoid the indignity of being sued after having caused a road incident, in addition to protecting their apparently only viable mode of transportation.

Insurers can take into account the overall trends in national risks trends for automobiles (eg new car safety, through the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, IIHS) as well as local or hyper-local risks (eg hail damage in the southeast, property crime in a particular zip code). And as a large country with nearly as many cars as people, many insurers are willing to meet the demand. This satisfies criteria B and C.

So well-organized is the automobile insurance market that you could almost say that it's vertically integrated: the largest nationwide insurers have contracts in place with every dealership network, auto collision chain, new and used parts dealers, as well as automatic data sharing with state DMVs, plus with firms like CarFax that buy information. Despite each state being slightly different, the insurers have overcome and achieved a level of near uniformity that allows an efficient market to exist.

Things are drastically different for the American healthcare system and for American health insurance companies. While most think of their healthcare provider as a national name like Anthem Blue Cross or Kaiser Permanente, the reality is that each state is an island, and sometimes counties in a state are enclaves. Even federal programs like Medicaid and Medicare are subject to state-level non-uniformities. For example, hospitals can be either privately operated (eg religion-affiliated, or for-profit) or run by a public entity (eg county or state), and can exist as a single entity or form part of a regional hospital network. Some entities operate both the insurance pool as well as providing the health care (eg HMOs like Kaiser Permanente) while others dispatch to a list of contracted providers, usually being doctor's own private practices or specialist offices.

With so many disparate entities, and where healthcare is a heavily-regulated activity by each state, the cost of insurable risks -- that is, for routine healthcare services -- is already kinda difficult to compute. Hospitals and doctors go through intense negotiations with insurers to come to an agreement on reimbursement rates, but the reality is that neither has sufficient actuarial data to price based on what can be borne by the market. So they just pass their costs on, whatever those may be, and insurers either accept it into their calculations, or drop the provider.

Suffice it to say, there are fewer pressure to push the total cost of healthcare down, given this reality, and more likely prices will continue to climb. This fails criteria C.

Briefly speaking, it's fairly self explanatory why people would want health insurance, since the alternative is either death or serious health repercussions, paying out-of-pocket rates for service, or going to the ER and being burdened by medical debt that will somehow haunt even after death. Criteria A is present.

As for Criteria B, that was actually resolved as part of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). During discussions with the drafters, insurers bargained for an obligation for everyone to have insurance (aka the individual mandate, bolstering criteria A), in exchange for an obligation to issue policies for anyone who applies, irrespective of pre-existing health conditions. Thus, Criteria B is present for all ACA-compliant policies in the USA, even though the individual mandate was later legislatively repealed.

So to answer your question directly, the costs for healthcare in the USA continue to spiral so far out of control that it causes distortions in the health insurance market, to everyone's detriment. Specific issues such as open-enrollment periods, employer subsidies, and incomprehensible coverage levels all stem from -- and are attempts to reduce -- costs.

Enrollment periods prevent people from changing plans immediately after obtaining an expensive service, like a major surgery. Employer subsidies exist due to a federal tax quirk decades ago, which has now accidentally become an essential part of the health insurance and health care situation. And coverage levels try to provide tiered plans, so people can still afford minimal coverage for "catastrophic" injuries while others can buy coverage for known, recurring medical needs.

But these are all bandaging the bleeding which is unchecked costs. It would take an act of Congress -- literally -- or of state legislatures to address the structural issues at play. The most prominent solution to nip costs is the bud is to achieve the same near-vertical integration as with automobile insurance. This means a single or very few entities which have contracts in place with every provider (doctors and hospitals), negotiated at once and uniformly, so as to achieve criteria C. The single-payer model -- which Medicare already uses -- is one such solution.

Going further would be the universal healthcare model, which discards the notion of health insurance entirely and creates an obligation for a government department to provide for the health of the citizens, funded by taxes. This means doctors and hospitals work at the behest of the department for the citizenry, or work privately outside the system entirely, with no guarantee of a steady stream of work. Substantial administrative savings would arise, since the number of players has been reduced and thus simplifies things, including the basic act of billing and getting paid for services rendered.

These models could be approached by individual states or by the nation as a whole, but it's unclear where the Overton window for that idea currently is.

A commenter already provided a fairly comprehensive description of low-level computer security positions. But I also want to note that a firm foundation in low-level implementations is also useful for designing embedded software and firmware.

As in, writing or deploying against custom BIOS/UEFI images, or for real-time devices where timing is of the essence. Most anyone dealing with an RTOS or kernel drivers or protocol buses will necessarily require an understanding of both the hardware architecture plus the programming language available to them. And if that appeals to you, you might consider looking into embedded software development.

The field spans anything from writing the control loop for washing machines, to managing data exchange between multiple video co-processors onboard a flying drone to identify and avoid collisions, to negotiating the protocol to set up a 400 Gbps optical transceiver to shoot a laser down 40 km of fibre.

If something "thinks" but doesn't have a monitor and keyboard, it's likely to have one or more processors running embedded software. Look around the room you're in and see what this field has enabled.

It's a straightforward question with a not-so-straightforward answer. I'm not any sort of lawyer, but I will borrow the classic lawyer answer of: "It Depends".

To start, the question of legalizing cannabis -- meaning its sale, distribution, and consumption is as easy as for any other good -- is distinct from the question of decriminalizing cannabis, which means it's not a criminal offense to grow, sell, or consume.

Right off the bat, we can say that the US President cannot fully legalize cannabis nationwide with the stroke of a pen, because the several states can (and already do?) have their own laws and regulations on cannabis and other drugs, parallel to the federal laws. But decriminalization is feasible, since the federal statues that criminalize cannabis are based on the drug schedules, which are regulations issued by DEA pursuant to authority granted by Congress. And that matters because most drug defendants are prosecuted under federal law.

Of course, the several states could start writing their own laws to criminalize cannabis, but that would be kinda weird since the majority of states already allow medical marijuana, and a fair number allow recreational marijuana. So re-criminalizing cannabis would repeal those rather popular laws.

So we move to how the DEA can amend the drug schedules, or how the US President can instruct the DEA Administrator. Because Congress is the grantor of such authority to the DEA and other executive agencies, and seeking to prevent regulations from whimsically flip-flopping with the passing breeze, Congress introduced the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) in 1946.

As the name suggests, the Act sets up the rules for how regulations issued by agencies shall be performed. Most of the rules mirror those of Congressional procedure, meaning that the agency must conduct hearings on proposed rule changes openly, with the opportunity for the public to submit comments. That is, regulations suddenly appearing from behind closed doors is not permitted.

Part of the rules require fixed timelines, such as a number of days for sending in comments, plus a number of days for publishing the full text of the proposed rule into the Federal Register, before the rule can become active.

Furthermore, the Act instructs the judiciary to review regulations if someone raises a challenge to the adopted regulation. Among the things the judiciary will look at is whether the regulation is improperly "arbitrary and capricious", meaning the regulation was pretextual and is instead serving a goal outside of what Congress intended for the agency to be doing. That link describes some examples deemed to be impermissible.

If the US President issued a brief, non-explanatory executive order to remove cannabis from the drug schedules, thus shortcutting the rulemaking procedure and the period for public comment, a court challenge could arise where someone claims the regulation is arbitrary and capricious, since Congress would have expected the DEA to do a full, extensive job of considering the implications of drug availability. If the executive order does not do a similarly extensive consideration of what the DEA staff would do, then the court challenge would stand a decent chance. To be clear, the regulation via executive order would be struck down on procedural grounds, per the APA.

What if instead, the US President sternly instructs the DEA Administrator to immediately consider descheduling cannabis? This is more likely to withstand challenge, since the DEA staff would go through their normal evaluation procedure, even if it's at an expedited rate. Thoroughness is one way to avoid being struck for arbitrary-and-capriciousness.

But there's still a wrinkle, due to the recent demise of Chevron Deference, a doctrine where federal courts generally defer to the subject-matter experts within an executive agency if the enabling law was silent, so long as the APA's other requirements were met. This leads to the weird possibility that a federal judge -- who is unlikely to be well-versed in drug and social implications -- can substitute the learned opinion of doctors and scientists within DEA with their own judicial opinion. If this sounds similar to the very arbitrary-and-capricious issue from earlier, you'd be right: a single person -- in the judiciary, no less -- writing regulations for drug policy is hardly what Congress intended in authoring the Controlled Substance Act in the 70s.

The overall answer is that the US President has significant sway over the DEA Administrator and can expedite the rulemaking process to deschedule cannabis, thus decriminalizing it at the federal level. But even an un-expedited rulemaking process would attract legal challenges like flies to flypaper, slowing down when the regulation comes into force. And if a federal judge decides to do so, they can outright cancel the descheduling regulation, choosing to not defer to the DEA, even if the DEA articulated their reasoning well. While it would make logical sense that such a judge must have jurisdiction over DEA, which is headquartered in Washington DC, the reality is that federal agencies can be challenged in any federal court, including ones with, uh, very outspoken opinions on federalism.

A more permanent change would be to decriminalize/legalize through Congress, since at that point, no future administration could roll that back. We've seen how fragile some rules or rulings can be, namely in the case of Roe v Wade being undone, as the decision was never codified into law, which would have made it much safer from judicial challenges.

It really depends.

I am prepared to bid one cake for your birthday. This one: 🎂

This article indicates that the USA FDA allows for up to a 20% margin of error for values required to be on the Nutrition Facts label. The article also describes multiple methods of measuring the calorific value of food, either by burning it in the not-so-TSA-friendly-named bomb calorimeter or through methods that have standardized the calorific value of each constituent nutrient.

It's also the case that not every foodstuff is perfectly identical to all other products. A banana is hardly going to be constituted exactly like another banana, and even the most basic measurement of mass will not match up to other bananas. Yet some sort of "standard" banana must be assumed in order to print the nutrition label.

As an aside, I do fondly remember making a bomb calorimeter in chemistry class using a polystyrene cup as the insulation. It worked remarkably well, IIRC, being within 10% of what we were given as the expected value. Obviously, real measurements would be far more controlled than what some college freshmen can manage, but the concept is sound, if only measuring what the food provides, not necessarily what the human digestive tract can extract.

As an aside to an aside, celery appears to not be a negative-calorie food, even after considering human digestion.

I live in a sunny climate (California), so I'm genuinely curious: would the solution to icy roads be winter tires? And does winter tire == snow tire?

I understand studded tires are also an option, but I think their use in this state is heavily curtailed or outright prohibited because of the damage they inflict on the road surface.

I don't think I'd ever want to tackle ice in an automobile, although I'm told studded bicycle tires are very competent in winter and don't have as many performance penalties as their car equivalent. I'd probably try that at least once in this lifetime.

Now that I think about it, you might be right. The Mazda 5 is a minivan, and a lifted version of that would be some sort of #vanLyfe vehicle, whereas the CX-5 is a crossover SUV with five doors.

But surely the CX-5 can't be the Mazda 2 or an uplifted version of it, since the 2 is (was?) a three door vehicle, no?