damn…
bunchberry @ bunchberry @lemmy.world Posts 0Comments 103Joined 1 yr. ago
bunchberry @ bunchberry @lemmy.world
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What is thought of as opposed to thought itself must necessarily exist prior to the thought in order for it to enter into thought and be what is thought of in the first place. I mean, it's just self-evident, is it not? If all thoughts cease, reality doesn't disappear. It's always there independent of whether or not thought is applied to it or not, whether or not there is an attempt to interpret it. It exists independent of any attempt made to formulate a subjective interpretation of it. That's all that is meant here by "objective," that reality is what it is entirely independent of what it is subjectively taken to be.
I think you are just trying to fight rather than actually have a discussion so I'm not really interested in going on, but I will say one last thing to clarify what I am saying for other people who might be reading.
If you say observation = interaction then this inherently leads you to RQM which is like the definition of the interpretation. As I said at the beginning, I do support this interpretation, I think it's the most reasonable approach, but it should be made clear this is a rather fringe point of view and not supported by most academics. You can see in the paper below only 6% of academics support it. And you clearly don't seem to support it yourself as you seem to be pushing back against that rather than just agreeing with my statement it is the most intuitive way to think about things.
https://arxiv.org/abs/1301.1069
The plurality there support the Copenhagen view where observation really is given a special role.
Without going the route of RQM then you end up with something that is just objectively false as the wave function would be incapable of spreading out since particles are always interacting with things, rendering quantum phenomena impossible.
You can clarify instead by saying observation → interaction, that is to say, an observation implies an interaction, i.e. it inherently always entails an interaction but not interactions are observations, however, if you do this, you end up with the measurement problem. That is to say, you need to actually construct a theory to account for what kinds of interactions actually qualify as a measurement/observation. To quote John Bell...
What exactly qualifies some physical systems to play the role of 'measurer'? Was the wavefunction of the world waiting to jump for thousands of millions of years until a single-celled living creature appeared? Or did it have to wait a little longer, for some better qualified system . . . with a PhD?
https://philpapers.org/rec/BELAM
Specifying a theory of measurement is known as an "objective collapse" model and they make different predictions than traditional quantum mechanics because depending on where you set the threshold for what kind of interaction qualifies as an "observation" changes how much the wave function can spread out before being collapsed again by such an "observation."
There are several models of this like the Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber theory and the Diósi–Penrose model but these are ultimately more than just other interpretations of quantum mechanics but ultimately entirely new theories.
It is not so simple just to say "observation is an interaction" and then pretend like the job is done, or else there would be no confusion in interpreting quantum mechanics at all. There is a lot more clarification that has to be made in order for it to make sense.
Why do you keep asking that? I already explained I'm not claiming observations = no interactions in extensive detail and you turn around and ask me that gain.
Saying that observations are a special kind of interaction does seem to be privileging humans, though? What is different from measurements/observations and any other interaction?
There is no mind-body problem in the first place. All dualisms and idealisms are circular as they start from the premise that reality is subject-dependent then work backwards from that conclusion, but they never justify that premise. Even many materialists fall for it.
That's not what I'm saying. My point is just that observation = interaction has a lot of implications. Particles are always interacting, so if the wave function represented some absolute state of a system, then the statement would just be incorrect because the wave function would be incapable of ever "spreading out" as it is constantly interacting with a lot of things yet we don't "collapse" it in the mathematics until it interacts very specifically with us.
The only way it can be made consistent is to then say that wave functions are not absolute things but instead describe something relative to a particular system, sort of like how in Galilean relativity you need to specify a coordinate system to describe certain properties like velocity of systems. You pick a referent object as the "center" of the coordinate system which you describe other systems from that reference frame.
You would have to treat the wave function in a similar way, as something more coordinate than an actual entity. That would explain why it can differ between context frames (i.e. Wigner's friend), and would explain why you have to "collapse" it when you interact with something, as the context would've changed so you would need to "zero" it again kinda like tarring a scale.
Often we leave out the referent object and it becomes implicit, such as if we say a car is traveling at 50 km/h, there is an implication here "relative to the earth." That is implied so it doesn't really need to be said, but people can become confused and think 50 km/h is really a property intrinsic to the car because we always leave it out.
That's where a lot of confusion in QM comes from: we usually are concerned with what we will observe ourselves, what will actually show up on our measuring devices, so we implicitly use ourselves and our measuring devices as the referent object and by extension forget that we are describing properties of things relative to a particular coordinate system and not absolute.
If you suggest every observation is an interaction then you inherently are getting into the relational interpretation. Which I am not saying you're wrong to do so, I think it is the most intuitive way to think about things, but it is not a very popular viewpoint.
Physicists seem to love their confusing language. Why do they associate Bell's theorem with "local realism"? I get "local," that maps to Lorentz invariance. But what does "realism" even mean? That's a philosophical term, not a physical one, and I've seen at least 4 different ways it has been defined in the literature. Some papers use the philosophical meaning, belief in an observer-independent reality, some associate it with the outcome of experiments being predictable/predetermined, some associate it with particles having definite values at all times, and others argue that realism has to be broken up into different "kinds" of realism like "strong" realism and "weak" realism with different meanings.
I saw a physicist recently who made a video complaining about how frustrated they are that everyone associates the term "dark matter" with matter that doesn't interact with the electromagnetic field (hence "dark"), when in reality dark matter just refers to a list of observations which particle theories are currently the leading explanation for but technically the term doesn't imply a particular class of theories and thus is not a claim that the observations are explained by matter that is "dark." They were like genuinely upset and had an hour long video about people keep misunderstanding the term "dark matter" is just a list of observation, but like, why call it dark matter then if that's not what it is?
There really needs to be some sort of like organization that sets official names for terminology, kinda like how the French government has an official organization that defines what is considered real French so if there is any confusion in the language you at least have something to refer to. That way there can be some thought put into terminology used.
We can't see wave functions. It is a tool used to predict observations but itself cannot be observed, and cannot be an observable object as it exists in an abstract Hilbert space and not even in spacetime. It is only "space" in the sense of a state space, kind of like how if I have a radio with 4 knobs, I can describe the settings with a single point in a 4 dimensional space. That doesn't mean the radio actually is a 4 dimensional object existing in this state space, it only means that we can represent that way for convenience, and the dimensions here moreso represent degrees of freedom.
If you believe everything is a wave function then you believe the whole universe is made out of things that cannot be observed. So how does that explain what we observe? Just leads to confusion. Confusion not caused by the mathematics but self-imposed. Nothing about the mathematics says you literally have to think everything is made out of waves. In fact, Heisenberg's original formulation of quantum mechanics made all the same predictions yet this was before the Schrodinger equation was even invented.
People take the wave formulation way too literally and ultimately it just produces much of this confusion. They are misleadingly taught that you can think of things turning into waves by starting with the double-slit experiment, except it is horribly misleading because they think the interference pattern they're seeing is the wave function. Yet, (1) the wave function is associated with individual particles, not the interference pattern which is formed by thousands, millions of particles. There is nothing wave-like visible with just a single particle experiment. (2) Even the interference pattern formed by millions of particles does not contain the information of the wave function, only a projection of it, sort of like its "shadow" as the imaginary terms are lost when you apply the Born rule to it and square it. (3) They also like to depict a literal wave moving through two slits, but again there are imaginary components which don't map to anything physically real, and so the depiction is a lie as information has to be removed in order to actually display a wave on the screen.
The moment you look at literally anything that isn't the double-slit experiment, the intuitive notion of imagining waves moving through space breaks down. Consider a quantum computer where the qubits are electrons with up or down spin representing 0 or 1. You can also represent the state of the quantum computer with a wave function, yet what does it even mean to imagine the computer's internal state is a wave when there is nothing moving at all and the state of the quantum computer doesn't even have position as one of its values? You can't point to that wave even existing anywhere, you get lost in confusion if you try.
This cloud is described by a mathematical object called wave function. The Austrian physicist Erwin Schrödinger has written an equation describing its evolution in time. Quantum mechanics is often mistakenly identified with this equation. Schrödinger had hopes that the ‘wave’ could be used to explain the oddities of quantum theory: from those of the sea to electromagnetic ones, waves are something we understand well. Even today, some physicists try to understand quantum mechanics by thinking that reality is the Schrödinger wave. But Heisenberg and Dirac understood at once that this would not do.
To view Schrödinger’s wave as something real is to give it too much weight – it doesn’t help us to understand the theory; on the contrary, it leads to greater confusion. Except for special cases, the Schrödinger wave is not in physical space, and this divests it of all its intuitive character. But the main reason why Schrödinger’s wave is a bad image of reality is the fact that, when a particle collides with something else, it is always at a point: it is never spread out in space like a wave. If we conceive an electron as a wave, we get in trouble explaining how this wave instantly concentrates to a point at each collision. Schrödinger’s wave is not a useful representation of reality: it is an aid to calculation which permits us to predict with some degree of precision where the electron will reappear. The reality of the electron is not a wave: it is how it manifests itself in interactions
--- Carlo Rovelli, "Reality is Not What it Seems"
It is more intuitive to not think of wave functions as entities at all. But people have this very specific mathematical notation so burned into their heads from the repeated uses of the double-slit experiment that it is very difficult to get it out of their heads. Not only did Heisenberg instead use matrix transformation rather than the Schrodinger equation to represent QM, but it is also possible to represent quantum mechanics in even a third mathematical formulation known as the ensemble in phase space formulation.
The point here is that the Schrodinger equation is just one mathematical formalism in which there are multiple mathematically equivalent ways to formulate quantum mechanics, and so treating these wave functions wave really existing waves moving through a Hilbert space which you try to imagine as something like our own spacetime seems to be putting too much weight on a very specific formalism and ultimately is the source of a lot of the confusion. Describing the whole universe as thus a giant wave in Hilbert space evolving according to the Schrodinger equation is thus rather dubious, especially since these are entirely metaphysical constructs without any observable properties.
The traditional notion of cause and effect is not something all philosophers even agree upon, I mean many materialist philosophers largely rejected the notion of simple cause-and-effect chains that go back to the "first cause" since the 1800s, and that idea is still pretty popular in some eastern countries.
For example, in China they teach "dialectical materialist" philosophy part of required "common core" in universities for any degree, and that philosophical school sees cause and effect as in a sense dependent upon point of view, that an effect being described as a particular cause is just a way of looking at things, and the same relationship under a different point of view may in fact reverse what is considered the cause and the effect, viewing the effect as the cause and vice-versa. Other points of view may even ascribe entirely different things as the cause.
It has a very holistic view of the material world so there really is no single cause to any effect, so what you choose to identify as the cause is more of a label placed by an individual based on causes that are relevant to them and not necessarily because those are truly the only causes. In a more holistic view of nature, Laplacian-style determinism doesn't even make sense because it implies nature is reducible down to separable causes which can all be isolated from the rest and their properties can then be fully accounted for, allowing one to predict the future with certainty.
However, in a more holistic view of nature, it makes no sense to speak of the universe being reducible to separable causes as, again, what we label as causes are human constructs and the universe is not actually separable. In fact, the physicists Dmitry Blokhintsev had written a paper in response to a paper Albert Einstein wrote criticizing Einstein's distaste for quantum mechanics as based on his adherence to the notion of separability which stems from Newtonian and Kantian philosophy, something which dialectical materialists, which Blokhintsev self-identified as, had rejected on philosophical grounds.
He wrote this paper many many years prior to the publication of Bell's theorem which showed that giving up on separability (and by extension absolute determinism) really is a necessity in quantum mechanics. Blokhintsev would then go on to write a whole book called The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics where in it he argues that separability in nature is an illusion and under a more holistic picture absolute determinism makes no sense, again, purely from materialistic grounds.
The point I'm making is ultimately just that a lot of the properties people try to ascribe to "materialists" or "naturalists" which then later try to show quantum mechanics is in contradiction with, they seem to forget that these are large umbrella philosophies with many different sects and there have been materialist philosophers criticizing absolute determinism as even being a meaningful concept since at least the 1800s.
Use IBM's cloud quantum computers to learn a bit, you can indeed find YouTube videos that explain to you how to do the calculations and then you can just play around making algorithms on their systems and verifying that you can do the calculations correctly. With that knowledge alone you can then begin to learn how to step through a lot of the famous experiments that all purport to show the strangeness of quantum mechanics, like Bell's theorem, the "bomb tester" thought experiment, GHZ experiment, quantum teleportation, etc, as most of the famous ones can be implemented on a quantum computer and you can get an understanding of why they are interesting.
That would seem like more of a question of sociology and history, studying why certain cultures develop the ideas they do, and it probably would not be the same for every culture. Not really a question that I have the proper expertise on to answer.
I agree experience is incalculable but not because it is some special immaterial substance but because experience just is objective reality from a particular context frame. I can do all the calculations I want on a piece of paper describing the properties of fire, but the paper it's written on won't suddenly burst into flames. A description of an object will never converge into a real object, and by no means will descriptions of reality ever become reality itself. The notion that experience is incalculable is just uninteresting. Of course, we can say the same about the wave function. We use it as a tool to predict where we will see real particles. You also cannot compute the real particles from the wave function either because it's not a real entity but a description of relationships between observations (i.e. experiences) of real things.
The subjective experience of consciousness is directly observable, and definitely real, no?
Experience is definitely real, but there is no such thing as "subjective experience." It is not logically possible to say there is "subjective experience" without inherently entailing that there is some sort of "objective experience," in the same way that saying something is "inside of" something makes no sense unless there is an "outside of" it. Without implicitly entailing some sort of "objective experience" then the qualifier "subjective" would become meaningless.
If you associate "experience" with "minds," then you'd be implying there is some sort of objective mind, i.e. a cosmic consciousness of some sorts. Which, you can believe that, but at that point you've just embraced objective idealism. The very usage of the term "subjective experience" that is supposedly inherently irreducible to non-minds inherently entails objective idealism, there is no way out of it once you've accepted that premise.
The conflation between experience with "subjectivity" is largely done because we all experience the world in a way unique to us, so we conclude experience is "subjective." But a lot of things can be experienced differently between different observers. Two observers, for example, can measure the same object to be different velocities, not because velocity is subjective, but because they occupy different frames of reference. In other words, the notion that something being unique to us proves it is "subjective" is a non sequitur, there can be other reasons for it to be unique to us, which is just that nature is context-dependent.
Reality itself depends upon where you are standing in it, how you are looking at it, everything in your surroundings, etc, how everything relates to everything else from a particular reference frame. So, naturally, two observers occupying different contexts will perceive the world differently, not because their perception is "subjective," but in spite of it. We experience the world as it exists independent of our observation of it, but not independent of the context of our observation. Experience itself is not subjective, although what we take experience to be might be subjective.
We can misinterpret things for example, we can come to falsely believe we experienced some particular thing and later it turns out we actually perceived something else, and thus were mistaken in our initial interpretation which we later replaced with a new interpretation. However, at no point did it become false that there was experience. Reality can never be true or false, it always just is what it is. The notion that there is some sort of "explanatory gap" between what humans experience and some sort of cosmic experience is just an invented problem. There is no gap because what we experience is indeed reality independent of conscious observers being there to interpret it, but absolutely dependent upon the context under which it is observed.
Again, I'd recommend reading Jocelyn Benoist's Toward a Contextual Realism. All this is explained in detail and any possible rebuttal you're thinking of has already been addressed. People are often afraid of treating experience as real because they operate on this Kantian "phenomenal-noumenal" paradigm (inherently implied by the usage of "subjective experience") and then think if they admit that this unobservable "noumenon" is a meaningless construct then they have to default to only accepting the "phenomenon," i.e. that there's only "subjective experience" and we're all "trapped in our minds" so to speak. But the whole point of contextual realism is to point out this fear is unfounded because both the phenomenal and noumenal categories are problematic and both have to be discarded: experience is not "phenomenal" as a "phenomenal" means "appearance of reality" but it is not the appearance of reality but is reality.
You only enter into subjectivity, again, when you take reality to be something, when you begin assigning labels to it, when you begin to invent abstract categories and names to try and categorize what you are experiencing. (Although the overwhelming majority of abstract categories you use were not created by you but are social constructs, part of what Wittgenstein called the "language game.")
(I don’t think adding some metaphysical element does much of anything, and Penrose still doesn’t really explain it, just provides a potential mechanism for it in the brain. It’s still a real “thing”, unexplained by current physics though.)
We don't need more metaphysical elements, we need less. We need to stop presuming things that have no reason to be presumed, then presuming other things to fix contradictions created by those false presumptions. We need to discard those bad assumptions that led to the contradiction in the first place (discard then phenomenal-noumenal distinction entirely, not just one or the other).
Also, to your other point, my I believe everything is just an evolving wave function.
This is basically the Many Worlds Interpretation. I don't really buy it because we can't observe wave functions, so if the entire universe is made of wave functions... how does that explain what we observe? You end up with an explanatory gap between what we observe and the mathematical description.
The whole point of science is to explain the reality which we observe, which is synonymous with experience, which again experience just is reality. That's what science is supposed to do: explain experiential reality, so we have to tie it back to experience, what Bell called "local beables," things we can actually point to identify in our observations.
The biggest issue with MWI is that there is simply no way to tie it back to what we actually observe because it contains nothing observable. There is an explanatory gap between the world of waves in Hilbert space and what we actually observe in reality.
The Copenhagen interpretation is just how the many worlds universe appears to behave to a conscious observer.
What you've basically done is just wrapped up the difficult question of how the invisible world of waves in Hilbert space converts itself to the visible world of particles in spacetime by just saying "oh it has something to do with our consciousness." I mean, sure, if you find that to be satisfactory, I personally don't.
No, we don't know the brain is making use of any quantum phenomena. At best if there is any quantum phenomena in the brain it would just contribute noise. The idea that interference phenomena is actually made use of in the brain for computation is just not backed by anything.
There 100% are…
If you choose to believe so, like I said I don't really care. Is a quantum computer conscious? I think it's a bit irrelevant whether or not they exist. I will concede they do for the sake of discussion.
Penrose thinks they’re responsible for consciousness.
Yeah, and as I said, Penrose was wrong, not because the measurement problem isn't the cause for consciousness, but that there is no measurement problem nor a "hard problem." Penrose plays on the same logical fallacies I pointed out to come to believe there are two problems where none actually exist and then, because both problems originate from the same logical fallacies. He then notices they are similar and thinks "solving" one is necessary for "solving" the other, when neither problems actually existed in the first place.
Because we also don’t know what makes anesthesia stop consciousness. And anesthesia stops consciousness and stops the quantum process.
You'd need to define what you mean more specifically about "consciousness" and "quantum process." We don't remember things that occur when we're under anesthesia, so are we saying memory is consciousness?
Now, the math isn’t clean. I forget which way it leans, but I think it’s that consciousness kicks out a little before the quantum action is fully inhibited? It’s been a minute, and this shit isn’t simple.
Sure, it's not simple, because the notion of "consciousness" as used in philosophy is a very vague and slippery word with hundreds of different meanings depending on the context, and this makes it seem "mysterious" as its meaning is slippery and can change from context to context, making it difficult to pin down what is even being talked about.
Yet, if you pin it down, if you are actually specific about what you mean, then you don't run into any confusion. The "hard problem of consciousness" is not even a "problem" as a "problem" implies you want to solve it, and most philosophers who advocate for it like David Chalmers, well, advocate for it. They spend their whole career arguing in favor of its existence and then using it as a basis for their own dualistic philosophy. It is thus a hard axiom of consciousness and not a hard problem. I simply disagree with the axioms.
Penrose is an odd case because he accepts the axioms and then carries that same thinking into QM where the same contradiction re-emerges but actually thinks it is somehow solvable. What is a "measurement" if not an "observation," and what is an "observation" if not an "experience"? The same "measurement problem" is just a reflection of the very same "hard problem" about the supposed "phenomenality" of experience and the explanatory gap between what we actually experience and what supposedly exists beyond it.
It’s the quantum wave function collapse that’s important.
Why should I believe there is a physical collapse? This requires you to, again, posit that there physically exists something that lies beyond all possibilities of us ever observing it (paralleling Kant's "noumenon") which suddenly transforms itself into something we can actually observe the moment we try to look at it (paralleling Kant's "phenomenon"). This clearly introduces an explanatory gap as to how this process occurs, which is the basis of the measurement problem in the first place.
There is no reason to posit a physical "collapse" or even that there exists at all a realm of waves floating about in Hilbert space. These are unnecessary metaphysical assumptions that are purely philosophical and contribute nothing but confusion to an understanding of the mathematics of the theory. Again, just like Chalmers' so-called "hard problem," Penrose is inventing a problem to solve which we have no reason to believe is even a problem in the first place: nothing about quantum theory demands that you believe particles really turn into invisible waves in Hilbert space when you aren't looking at them and suddenly turn back into visible particles in spacetime when you do look at them.
That's entirely metaphysical and arbitrary to believe in.
There’s no spinning out where multiple things happen, there is only one thing. After wave collapse, is when you look in the box and see if the cats dead. In a sense it’s the literal “observer effect” happening our head. And that is probably what consciousness is.
There is only an "observer effect" if you believe the cat literally did turn into a wave and you perturbed that wave by looking at it and caused it to "collapse" like a house of cards. What did the cat see in its perspective? How did it feel for the cat to turn into a wave? The whole point of Schrodinger's cat thought experiment was that Schrodinger was trying to argue against believing particles really turn into waves because then you'd have to believe unreasonable things like cats turning into waves.
All of this is entirely metaphysical, there is no observations that can confirm this interpretation. You can only justify the claim that cats literally turn into waves when you don't look at them and there is a physical collapse of that wave when you do look at them on purely philosophical grounds. It is not demanded by the theory at all. You choose to believe it purely on philosophical grounds which then leads you to think there is some "problem" with the theory that needs to be "solved," but it is purely metaphysical.
There is no actual contradiction between theory and evidence/observation, only contradiction between people's metaphysical assumptions that they refuse to question for some reason and what they a priori think the theory should be, rather than just rethinking their assumptions.
That’s how science works. Most won’t know who Penrose is till he’s dead.
I'd hardly consider what Penrose is doing to be "science" at all. All these physical "theories of consciousness" that purport not to just be explaining intelligence or self-awareness or things like that, but more specifically claim to be solving Chalmers' hard axiom of consciousness (that humans possess some immaterial invisible substance that is somehow attached to the brain but is not the brain itself), are all pseudoscience, because they are beginning with an unreasonable axiom which we have no scientific reason at all to take seriously and then trying to use science to "solve" it.
It is no different then claiming to use science to try and answer the question as to why humans have souls. Any "scientific" approach you use to try and answer that question is inherently pseudoscience because the axiomatic premise itself is flawed: it would be trying to solve a problem it never established is even a problem to be solved in the first place.
I don't believe there is an "illusions that we have free will," either. Honestly, "illusions" don't really even exist as they're traditionally talked about. People say if you place a stick in a cup of water, there is an "illusion" created that the stick is bent. But is there? What you see is just what a non-bent stick looks like in a cup of water. Its appearance is different from one out of water due to light refraction. It's not as if reality is tricking you by showing you a bent stick when there isn't one, that's just what a non-bent stick in water really looks like.
The only "illusion" is your own faulty interpretation of what you are seeing, which upon further inspection you may later find it is wrong and change your mind. There was simply no illusion there to begin with. Reality just presents itself as it actually exists, and it is us who interpret it, and sometimes we make mistakes and interpret it wrong. But it's not reality's fault we interpret it wrong sometimes. Reality is not wrong, nor is it right. It just is what it is.
In a similar sense, there is just no "illusion of free will." Neural networks are pattern recognition machines. We form models of the external world which can approximate different counterfactual realities, and we consider those realities to decide which one will optimize whatever goal we're trying to achieve. The fact we can consider counterfactual worlds doesn't mean that those counterfactual worlds really exist, and indeed our very consideration of them is part of the process of determining which decision we make.
Reality never tricks us into the counterfactual worlds really do in some way exist and we are selecting from these possible worlds. That's just an interpretation we sometimes impose artificially, but honestly I think it's exaggerated how much of an "illusion" this really is. A lot of regular people if you talk to them will probably admit quite easily that those counterfactual worlds don't exist anywhere but in their imagination, and that of course the only thing real is the decision that they made and the world they exist within where they made that decision.
Hence, reality is not in any way tricking us into thinking our decisions somehow have more power than they really do. It is some of us (not all of us, I'm not even convinced it's most of us) who impose greater powers to decision making than it actually has. There just is no "illusion of free will," at best there is your personal misinterpretation of what decision making actually entails.
Roger Penrose is pretty much the only dude looking into consciousness from the perspective of a physicist
I would recommend reading the philosophers Jocelyn Benoist and Francois-Igor Pris who argue very convincingly that both the "hard problem of consciousness" and the "measurement problem" stem from the same logical fallacies of conflating subjectivity (or sometimes called phenomenality) with contextuality, and that both disappear when you make this distinction, and so neither are actually problems for physics to solve but are caused by fallacious reasoning in some of our a priori assumptions about the properties of reality.
Benoist's book Toward a Contextual Realism and Pris' book Contextual Realism and Quantum Mechanics both cover this really well. They are based in late Wittgensteinian philosophy, so maybe reading Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is a good primer.
That’s the only way free will could exist...What would give humans free will would be the inherent randomness if the whole “quantum bubble collapse” was a fundamental part of consciousness.
Even if they discover quantum phenomena in the brain, all that would show is our brain is like a quantum computer. But nobody would argue quantum computers have free will, do they? People often like to conflate the determinism/free will debate with the debate over Laplacian determinism specifically, which should not be conflated, as randomness clearly has nothing to do with the question of free will.
If the state forced everyone into a job for life the moment they turned 18, but they chose that job using a quantum random number generator, would it be "free"? Obviously not. But we can also look at it in the reverse sense. If there was a God that knew every decision you were going to make, would that negate free will? Not necessarily. Just because something knows your decision ahead of time doesn't necessarily mean you did not make that decision yourself.
The determinism/free will debate is ultimately about whether or not human decisions are reducible to the laws of physics or not. Even if there is quantum phenomena in the brain that plays a real role in decision making, our decisions would still be reducible to the laws of physics and thus determined by them. Quantum mechanics is still deterministic in the nomological sense of the word, meaning, determinism according to the laws of physics. It is just not deterministic in the absolute Laplacian sense of the word that says you can predict the future with certainty if you knew all properties of all systems in the present.
If the conditions are exactly the same down to an atomic level… You’ll get the same results every time
I think a distinction should be made between Laplacian determinism and fatalism (not sure if there's a better word for the latter category). The difference here is that both claim there is only one future, but only the former claims the future is perfectly predictable from the states of things at present. So fatalism is less strict: even in quantum mechanics that is random, there is a single outcome that is "fated to be," but you could never predict it ahead of time.
Unless you ascribe to the Many Worlds Interpretation, I think you kind of have to accept a fatalistic position in regards to quantum mechanics, mainly due not to quantum mechanics itself but special relativity. In special relativity, different observers see time passing at different rates. You can thus build a time machine that can take you into the future just by traveling really fast, near the speed of light, then turning around and coming back home.
The only way for this to even be possible for there to be different reference frames that see time pass differently is if the future already, in some sense, pre-exists. This is sometimes known as the "block universe" which suggests that the future, present, and past are all equally "real" in some sense. For the future to be real, then, there has to be an outcome of each of the quantum random events already "decided" so to speak. Quantum mechanics is nomologically deterministic in the sense that it does describe nature as reducible to the laws of physics, but not deterministic in the Laplacian sense that you can predict the future with certainty knowing even in principle. It is more comparable to fatalism, that there is a single outcome fated to be (that is, again, unless you ascribe to MWI), but it's impossible to know ahead of time.
If our technology is limited so we can never see beyond something, why even propose it exists? Bell's theorem also demonstrates that if you do add hidden parameters, it would have to violate Lorentz invariance, meaning it would have to contradict with the predictions of our current best theories of the universe, like GR and QFT. Even as pure speculation it's rather dubious as there's no evidence that Lorentz invariance is ever violated.
You shouldn't take it that seriously. MWI has a lot of zealots in the popular media who act like it's a proven fact, kind of like some String Theorists do, but it is actually rather dubious.
MWI claims it is simpler because they are getting rid of the Born rule, so it has less assumptions, but the reason there is the Born rule in QM is because... well, it's needed to actually predict the right results. You can't just throw it out. It's also impossible to derive the Born rule without some sort of additional assumption, and there is no agreed upon way to do this.[1]
This makes MWI actually more complicated than traditional quantum mechanics because they have to add different arbitrary assumptions and then add an additional layer of mathematics to derive the Born rule from it, rather than assuming it. These derivations also tend to be incredibly arbitrary because the assumptions you have to make to derive it are always chosen specifically for the purpose of deriving the Born rule and don't seem to make much sense otherwise, and thus are just as arbitrary as assuming the Born rule directly.[2] [3]
If you prefer a video, the one below discusses various "multiverse" ideas including MWI and also discusses how it ultimately ends up being more mathematically complicated than other interpretations of QM.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QHa1vbwVaNU
MWI also makes no sense for a separate reason. If you consider the electromagnetic field for example, how do we know it exists? We know it exists because we can see its effect on particles. If you drop some iron filings around a magnet, it conforms to the shape of a field, but ultimately what you are seeing is the iron filings and not the field itself, but the effects of the field. Now, imagine if someone claimed the iron filings don't even exist, only the field. You'd be a bit confused because, well, you only know the field exists because of its effects on the filings. You can't see the field, only the particles, so if you deny the particles, then you're just left in confusion.
This is effectively what MWI does. We live in a world composed of spacetime containing particles, yet wave functions describe, well, waves made of nothing that exist in an abstract space known as Hilbert space. Schrodinger's derivation of his famous wave equation is based on observing the behavior of particles. MWI denies particles even exist and everything is just waves in Hilbert space made of nothing, which is very bizarre because then you would be effectively claiming the entire universe is composed of something entirely invisible. So how does that explain everything we see?
The philosopher Tim Maudlin has a whole lecture you can watch below on this problem, pointing out how MWI makes no sense because nothing in the interpretation includes anything we can actually observe. It quite literally describes a whole universe without observables.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=us7gbWWPUsA
Not to rain on your parade or anything if you are just having fun, but there is a lot of misinformation on websites like YouTube painting MWI as more reasonable than it actually is, so I just want people to be aware.