You can read more about this learning about X.509.
Its the PKI thats broken, namely the root stores. Has been unreliable for many, many years. This is why packages are signed.
So you are basically saying that root CAs are unreliable or compromised?
The great thing is, that you can decide on your own which CAs you trust.
Also please proof that those are actively malicious.
And no. That is not the reason that packages are signed, i am guessing you mean packages like on linux, packages contained in the installation repository.
The reason is, that you build another chain of trust. Why would i trust a CA which issues certificates for domains with code distribution. That's not their job.
Basically everything online can be done encrypted.
bittorrent has had support for encryption for years.
There are other challenges like hiding from DPI and the thing that you broadcast your torrent IP but the content can be securely emcrypted.
Surprised Transmission has issues seeding that many, thought Transmission 4.x made improvements in that area. How much RAM does your system have? Maybe at some point you just need more system resources to handle the load.
PS - For what it's worth you can still stick with Transmission and/or other torrent clients & just spread the torrents among multiple torrent client instances. e.g. run multiple Transmission instances with each seeding 1000 or whatever amount of torrents works for you.
Those are duck tape solutions. Why use them when there is a good solution
You can disable the web updater in the config which is the default when deploying via docker.
The only time i had a mismatch is when i migrated from a nativ debian installation to a docker one and fucked up some permissions. And that was during tinkering while migrating it. Its solid for me ever since.
Again, there is no official nextcloud auto updater, OP chose to use an auto updater which bricked OPs setup (a plugin was disabled).
They're releasing a new version every two month or so and dropping them rapidly from support, pinning it with a tag means that in 12 months the install would be exploitable.
So you are basically saying that root CAs are unreliable or compromised?
The great thing is, that you can decide on your own which CAs you trust. Also please proof that those are actively malicious.
And no. That is not the reason that packages are signed, i am guessing you mean packages like on linux, packages contained in the installation repository. The reason is, that you build another chain of trust. Why would i trust a CA which issues certificates for domains with code distribution. That's not their job.