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InitialsDiceBearhttps://github.com/dicebear/dicebearhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Initials” (https://github.com/dicebear/dicebear) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)KS
Posts
4
Comments
326
Joined
2 yr. ago

  • I loathe tiktok but if someone had banned Reddit while I was still using it I would have been hella mad. On the other hand it would have been "How will I manage without unhinged shitposts mixed with ads" from the outside

  • It's about the margins. If your phone contract was "100€/minute" that would be a scam. Also journals do have a lot more power than phone companies. Journals aren't a network of providers where you can choose whichever is cheapest.

  • One good thing about zstd is that the main developer is full-time employed to work on it. Alas he's employed by meta to do that... But it's likely harder to social engineer your way into that project

  • Have you tried contributing it upstream?

    I didn't yet just because I didn't get around to it (and because I am not sure the std lib even wants this feature).

    I’m not a “no unsafe” zealot, but in light of the xz issue, it would be nice.

    I don't think the two relate. I wouldn't drop any dependency, the ringbuffer is implemented in the same repo.

  • Sadly it does have one place with unsafe code. I needed a ringbuffer with an efficient "extend from within" implementation. I always wanted to contribute that to the standard library to actually get to no unsafe.

  • Yep that would be me :)

    There is also an independent implementation for golang, which even does compression iirc (there is also a golang implementation by me but don't use that. It's way way slower than the other one and unmaintained since I switched to rust development)

  • I have to admit I have no practical experience as a package maintainer, but this case sounds like there is a diff between files checked into the repo and the ones provided by the tarball.

    If the tarball contains new files that contain executable code that's still weird tbh, but I guess you have to trust the upstream maintainers to some degree. But a diff in a checked in file seems different to me.

  • The original email talks about a line that is in the release tar balls but not the repository itself that actually arms the exploit. This seems like something a maintainer should be able to verify.

    Not saying that they should have immediately seen that that is an exploit, the exploit is obfuscated very well. But this should be a big red flag right?